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Executive Summary
Families are more likely to save if they can conunit to savings before
funds are in-hand (and subject to spending temptations). For low- and
moderate-income U.S. families, an important savings opportunity
arises annually, during income tax season. We study a group of low-
income individuals in Tulsa, Oklahoma, who were encouraged to save
parts of their federal refunds at the time of tax filing. Those who agreed
to save directed a portion of their refund to a savings account and
arranged to have the rest sent to them in the form of a check. Eligible
individuals could also open low-cost savings accounts. We document
the demand for these services, the characteristics of those who sought
to participate, the savings goals of those who participated, the immedi-
ate savings generated by the program, and the disposition of savings a
few months after receipt. This pilot study suggests that there may be
demand among low-income families for a refund-splitting program
that supports emergency needs as well as asset building, especially if a
basic savings product is available to all at the time of tax filing.
1.Introduction
Saving is hard work. A saver must defer gratification today for the
sake of a better life tomorrow, much like a dieter, a recovering alco-
holic, or an ex-smoker must resist the nearby chocolate cake, beer, or
cigarette. In each case, removing the source of temptation is one pru-
dent strategy. In this spirit, would-be savers often direct money to sav-
ings before they are tempted to spend it. Financial advisors tell people
to "pay themselves first,"1 and this advice is embodied in a number of
institutional programs. In the workplace, automatic investment plans112 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
enable workers to deduct monies from their paychecks to fund savings
programs like 401(k) and 403(b) plans. Workers wifi sometimes force
savings by increasing the amount of withholding on their W2 forms.
Also in the workplace, the novel SMarT program, proposed by Thaler
and Benartzi (2004), enables workers to preconunit to save their raises.
Outside the workplace, automatic investment plans, like those offered
by mutual funds, allow investors to regularly sweep money from
transactional accounts into long-term investment accounts. Nearly all
of the 500 largest mutual funds (defined by assets under management)
allow investors to set up automatic monthly contributions.
All of these programs share a common trait: they tap into potential
savings sources before a person has the opportunity to spend. For low-
and moderate-income (LMI)2 U.S. families, annual federal and state
tax refunds are an important source of savable funds. In 2001 (the
most recent year for which data are available), LMI tax-filers received
more than $78 billion in total federal refund payments, including the
earned income tax credit (EITC), the child tax credit (CTC), other re-
fundable credits, and refunds from over-withholding (Internal Reve-
nue Service, Statistics of Income 2001). This massive flow of funds,
which takes place primarily during a few weeks in the early part of
the tax season, represents a substantial portion of the inflows of an
LIvil family. With an average value of $1,415 in 2001, a federal refund
payment is often more than the amount of a low-income family's regu-
lar bi-weekly paycheck, perhaps hundreds of dollars more.4 For a
family with income of less than $30,000 a year, the federal tax refund
would likely be the single largest payment received all year. In addi-
tion to being large, tax refunds are perhaps the most savable of funds,
out of reach for most of the year and hence beyond temptation.
Yet just as most workers cannot direct all of their salary into an auto-
matic investment program, most refund recipients cannot direct all of
their tax refunds to savings. In both cases, some funds are needed for
current living expenses and perhaps to pay past-due bifis. Ideally, a re-
fund recipient could savepartof her refund at the source, rather than
receiving all of the money and then having to decide how much of it
to spend and how much to save. This precommitment could be physi-
cal in nature (investing in a savings product with limited liquidity),
mostly psychological in nature (mentally segregating funds for sav-
ings), or a combination of the two. However, neither the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) nor the financial service sector has moved quickly to
enable LIV11 families to split their refunds and simultaneously precom-Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 113
mit to savings. It is unclear whether this reluctance is motivated by a
lack of facts (e.g., what fraction of families would use refund splitting
if it were offered and how much money would be saved out of
reftmds), a lack of focus on low-income families by financial service
firms, operational barriers to implementation, or perhaps other factors.
To gather some tentative empirical evidence about refund split-
ting, we entered into a collaborative research project in the spring of
2004. As described in more detail below, for four weeks during the
tax season, the team offered about 516 LMI filers at one of the nation's
largest free tax preparation sites the ability to split their refunds into
saving and spending components and, if needed, to open new savings
accounts to house their new savings. A participant could also deposit
his entire refund into a newly established account.
The collaborative research team included the Community Action
Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC), Doorways to Dreams (D2D) Fund,
the Bank of Oklahoma (BOk), the Annie E. Casey Foundation (AECF),
and the coauthors of this study. The program was called Refunds to
Assets (R2A), and the participantswhose adjusted gross incomes
averaged $12,300were drawn from CAPTC's existing tax prepara-
tion sites, with staff from CAPTC working on-site to enroll clients
in the program. D2D Fund oversaw the legal and administrative appa-
ratus of splitting. BOk opened new accounts for participants who
desired them.6 AECF and D2D provided funding for the experiment.
We, the academic research team, developed the research design, cre-
ated and administered a series of surveys, and analyzed data from the
experiment.
While our results are only suggestive, they support the intrigu-
ing notion that refund splitting might increase savings for low- and
moderate-income families or help them better manage their spending.
h short, we find that:
Over 20 percent of refund recipients studied sought to participate in
R2A by splitting their refunds, opening new savings accounts, or both.
Fifteen percent of refund recipients were able to participate in R2A.
Of these 79 participants, 56 percent opened new accounts and split
their refunds, 27 percent split their refunds and used existing accounts,
and 17 percent chose not to split and instead deposited their entire
refunds into new accounts.
The average participant saved $606 or about 47 percent of her refund.
One-fourth of participants had existing savings. These participants sent114 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
an average of $924 to savings; by their reports, this represented a
90 percent increase in savings. Three-fourths of participants reported
no prior saving, and these participants sent an average of $479 to
savings.
Participants had many savings goals, with the most common being
general precautionary savings, car purchase or repair, and home pur-
chase or repair. While we sometimes equate savings with long-term
goals, many of the saving goals mentioned by these low-income fami-
lies were short-term.
About four months after receiving refunds, bank account level data
shows that the average balance had dropped 83 percent. However, 78
percent of participants said that they were still saving or had met at
least one of their savings goals, and a larger fraction of R2A partici-
pants were stifi saving a portion of the refund or had met a savings
goal, when compared with a sample of refund recipients at a compari-
son site without access to the R2A service.
Follow-up survey data show that an overwhelming majority of par-
ticipants were pleased with the service, planned to use it again, would
recommend it to their friends, and were wffling to pay a nominal fee to
split.
We are not alone in advancing the idea that tax refunds could consti-
tute an important pool of potential savings. A refund-based savings
plan has been tested in a study by a team of researchers associated
with the Retirement Security Project. Working with H&R Block, the
researchers carried out an experiment in St. Louis in which they tested
whether they could increase saving out of refunds by providing match-
funding to savers opening individual retirement accounts (IRAs). The
preliminary results confirm evidence from other studies that matching
programs can augment savings;7 in this case, IRA contributions in-
crease with the level of match funding offered (Duflo, Gale, Liebman,
Orszag, and Saez 2005). While our studies differ along some key
dimensions, they independently provide suggestive evidence of the
power of refund-based savings programs.
The remainder of this paper provides the motivation for this re-
search project (Section 2), describes the experiment (Section 3), presents
our findings regarding take-up and initial saving (Section 4), presents
follow-up results related to saving outcomes and perceptions of the
program (Section 5), and offers some tentative conclusions and sugges-
tions for future research (Section 6).Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 115
2.Why Test Refund-Splitting for LMI Tax Filers?
2.1Public Policy and Asset Building
U.S. public policy enthusiastically encourages asset building through
a host of programs, estimated by some to cost the government
$335 biffion a year (Woo, Schweke, and Buchholz 2004). Calls for
an ownership society underscore the belief that asset building can
strengthen families and societies. By building financial assets, families
can weather temporary income shocks, demonstrate credit-worthiness,
purchase non-financial assets (like homes, durables, or education), earn
income, and prepare for retirement. Evidence suggests that asset hold-
ing can lead to increased residential stabffity, higher levels of social
and political engagement, and better life outcomes for children (Sherra-
den 1991, Page-Adams and Scanlon 2001).
Despite incentives to save and clear benefits from saving, Americans
save little of their annual earnings and have little in financial assets.
Data from the National Income and Products Accounts show that
the personal saving rate in the United States is low by historical stan-
dards. In 2003, Americans saved just 1.4 percent of disposable income,
sharply down from the 1950s through the 1990s when the saving rate
was between 7 percent and 10 percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis
2004).8
In addition to having low saving rates, Americans generally have
small stocks of assets. Haveman and Wolff (2001) have defined asset
poverty as lacking enough assets to live at the poverty level for three
months. Using this definition Caner and Wolff (2002) found that, in
1999, 40 percent of Americans did not have enough liquid assets to
live at the poverty level for three months. In a later paper, Wolff and
Caner (2004) find that asset poverty rates have been largely static from
1984 to 1999. More recent data from the Survey of Consumer Finances
emphasizes the degree to which the poor have very low levels of
assets; in 2001, 25 percent of households in the bottom income quintile
had no financial assets at all (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore 2003).
Public policy supporting asset building largely targets those who
have higher incomes and more assets. A recent report estimates that
the bottom 60 percent of tax filers by income received less than 5 per-
cent of the approximately $335 billion that the federal government
spent to encourage asset building through homeownership, retirement
savings, small business development, and investing (Woo, Schweke,
and Buchholz 2004). This bias is due in no small part to the provision116 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
of asset-building incentives through the income tax system, thereby
delivering the highest benefits to those who pay the highest taxes. Rea-
sonable people might disagree about where incentives for asset build-
ing should be concentrated on the basis of equity or macro-economic
effect. However, in terms of strengthening families and civic values,
adding some savings to those with the least probably has the largest
marginal effect. Creating incentives to add $10,000 in assets to a family
with $1 million in assets wifi surely have less impact than adding the
same amount to a family with no assets.
2.2Refunds and Asset Building
The current system encourages saving by reducing tax payments made
by the well-to-do. These tax-payer based incentives are ineffective for
low-income families who pay little tax, but the federal tax refund sys-
tem is a potentially powerful way to facilitate asset building among
LMJ families. As discussed below, the federal tax system delivers size-
able refunds that can be practically and mentally separated from regu-
lar employment earnings used to support everyday expenses.
Many LMI households receive large tax refunds as a result of
two federal tax credits: the fully refundable earned income tax credit
(EITC)9 and the partially refundable child tax credit (CTC).1° The aver-
age refundable EITC benefit in 2001 was $1,840 for the 10 million EITC
claimants with adjusted gross income (ACT) of less than $15,000, and
$1,640 for the 6.5 million families with ACT between $15,000 and
$30,000 (Internal Revenue Service 2001). Data on the size of the refund-
able portion of the CTC are not available by income, but outlays on the
refundable portion for all income groups were approximately $980 mil-
lion in 2001 and $5.8 billion in 2003 (Carasso and Steuerle 2003). When
all refund sources are considered (i.e., EITC, CTC, other refundable tax
credits, and over-withholding), in 2001, more than 30 million filers with
AGIs below $15,000 received refunds worth $1,176 on average, and
24.5 million filers with AGIs between $15,000 and $30,000 received
$1,710 on average. In the aggregate, these LMI families received more
than $78 billion in federal refunds (Internal Revenue Service 2001). Just
as the tax system subsidizes the saving of wealthy Americans through
preferential tax treatment for investment income, large tax refunds can
help other Americans to save.
Not only does the tax system distribute substantial funds, but it does
so in a way thatin partfacffitates savings. Neoclassical economic
theory assumes that funds are fungible, but behavioral economists
have documented the tendency for people to mentally group differentSplitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 117
monies into different pots. For example, one might write checks for
day-to-day expenses from one account and for big ticket items from
another. Or one might designate income from a primary job for living
expenses and income from a secondary job as savings.
This notion of mental accounting relates to the behavioral hypothe-
sis that people tend to view "irregular" income differently than wage
and salary income, especially when the irregular in-flows are large
(see, Thaler and Shefrin 1988). One specific prediction derived from
behavioral economic theory is that people who receive sizeable tax
refunds will consider saving at least some portion of their refunds
or using refunds to make special purchases rather than financing rou-
tine expenses. Some evidence supports this hypothesis. Smeeding et al.
(2000) found that 33 percent of a sample of 650 EITC recipients planned
to save at least a portion of their tax refunds; 16 percent planned to
purchase a car, repair a car, or make car payments; 13 percent planned
to purchase furniture or household appliances; 10 percent planned to
pay educational expenses; and 5 percent planned to purchase homes
or move. Consumer Expenditure Survey data suggest that families
often use tax refunds to purchase consumer durables, such as furniture
and vehicles (Barrow and McGranahan 2000). Thaler (1994) recognized
the savings opportunity presented by tax refunds and argued for an
additional credit for filers directly depositing refunds into individual
retirement accounts (IRAs).
Evidence regarding the use of tax refunds has also led volunteer
and for-profit tax preparers to encourage refund recipients to save
their refunds. Several free Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
tax preparation sites, locations that provide free income tax prepara-
tion services to low-income filers, have allowed tax filers to open sav-
ings accounts on-site and directly deposit their tax refunds into these
accounts.11 These programs usually involve a partnership between a
tax preparer (commercial or volunteer) and a financial institution.
Table 4.1 lists some of these programs. The most complete evaluation
to date of this type of service comes from a 2000 study of a program
sponsored by Shorebank and the Center for Economic Progress. Over
400 Chicago tax filers were invited to open low-cost Shorebank savings
accounts with their tax refunds, and about 20 percent did so. Two-
fifths of account-openers depleted their accounts very rapidly, but 14
percent maintained balances and perhaps added additional savings to
the accounts (Beverly, Tescher, Romich, and Marzahl 2002).
In the private sector, some H&R Block offices have piloted a pro-
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of accumulating emergency savings (Brookings Institution 2004). Tn the
2003 tax season, Block opened approximately 400 accounts with an av-
erage opening balance of $870. Only 2 percent of Block clients at the
offices offering the service opened accounts, but this take-up rate was
depressed by rigorous account opening requirements based on a credit
check (Tufano and Schneider 2004). Block also offered refund recipi-
ents on-site opening of IRAs. Over the three tax seasons from 2001 to
2004, the company opened more than 440,000 Express IRA accounts.
In 2004, the average balance on these accounts was $575 (Tufano and
Schneider 2004). As we mentioned earlier, a recent study conducted in
St. Louis in conjunction with H&R Block used the Express IRA product
to test whether it would be possible to increase retirement savings at
tax time (Duflo et al. 2005). Comparing this experiment with ours sug-
gests some interesting hypotheses, which we wifi discuss later.
Behavioral economists posit that people often make irrational deci-
sions about financial matters, due in large part to spending tempta-
tions (e.g., Shefrin and Thaler 1992; Thaler 1994, 2000). However, it is
possible to deliberately modify incentives and constraints to avoid or
overcome these temptations. Theory and empirical evidence suggests
that helping people enforce self-discipline by precomrniting money to
savings is effective. For example, some people arrange to have retire-
ment contributions automatically deducted from their paychecks. One
novel program has increased savings by having workers precommit to
save future raises.12 Another recent experiment in the Philippines
allowed participants to make deposits into a restricted withdrawal ac-
count, not in exchange for higher interest rates, but merely as a device
to commit to savings. Participants had significantly higher balances
over time than members of a control (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006).
Some people use mental or even physical accounting strategies to sep-
arate spending money from savings, and evidence suggests that these
psychological and behavioral strategies help people resist the urge to
withdraw savings (Beverly, Moore, and Schreiner 2003).
2.3Splitting Refunds and Building Assets
If people undersave because they have trouble resisting spending
temptations and if mental accounting helps people set aside money for
savings, then refund splittingphysically separating funds designated
for saving from funds designated for spendingmay be a valuable
tool to encourage saving. Currently, the IRS will send a refund to only
one account, and most poor families cannot save all of their refund.
Thus, whether the money is sent via a single paper check or directlySplitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 121
deposited to a single account, the would-be saver must receive the en-
tire refund, make a decision about saving, and then execute the saving
plan while spending part of the money.
Any program that deposits all money in one place and requires
recipients to save some leaves them open to spending temptations. Re-
fund recipients may mentally earmark part of their refunds for savings,
like a worker planning to save part of her paycheck. But unlike the
worker who can use a variety of programs to precommit some earn-
ings to savings, the refund recipient can only rely on her best inten-
tions, saving once the refund check or deposit has been received. If
it were possible to split the refund and send it to multiple destinations
at the time of filing a tax return, then a family could mentally and
physically separate saving and spending money and make saving au-
tomatic, thereby reducing the mental energy required to save. The in-
tention to save would be further reinforced if the savings portion were
directed to a savings-oriented financial product, especially one that
restricts withdrawals to some degree (although this may discourage
some from saving at all).
Some higher-income families have access to refund splitting. Van-
guard, the second largest mutual fund company in the United States,
allows investors to split their refunds among as many as four existing
Vanguard accounts (including money market accounts with check-
writing privileges that can be used as transaction accounts).'3 In 2004,
Vanguard was the only company out of the ten largest banks and ten
largest mutual funds with a formal splitting service,14 but some cus-
tomers with some brokerage accounts in other firms may be able to
have their brokers automatically split refunds across multiple invest-
ments. LMI families, however, are not likely customers of Vanguard
(whose funds typically require a minimum investment of at least
$3,000)15 nor of brokerage firms.
LIvil families do have access to some refund splitting, albeit of a dif-
ferent form. Clients who take out refund anticipation loans (RALs) split
their refunds, sending some to pay the tax preparer and receiving the
remainder. RAL splitting does not build assets, however, but instead
satisfies the need for very immediate spending. In addition, clients
opting to purchase H&R Block's Express IRA product at the time of tax
preparation have the option of splitting their refunds, directing some
to the newly opened IRA and receiving some as a direct deposit or as
a paper check (Tufano and Schneider 2005). However, splitting tied
explicitly to retirement savings may be less appealing to LMI families
with shorter-term savings goals.122 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
On logical grounds, we hypothesized that a simple splitting pro-
gram, with an option to open a new savings account, offered to LMI
families at the time of tax filing would facilitate asset building among
LMJ families. We hypothesized that (1) some LMI refund recipients
would choose to precomnüt part of their refunds; (2) splitting and pre-
committing would increase immediate savings; and (3) preconmiitting
and splitting, by leveraging mental accounting, would perhaps even
help people resist temptations to deviate from planned savings goals.
Our collaborative research team was formed to gather evidence to sup-
port or reject these hypotheses.
3.The 2003 Refunds to Assets Program
During the 2003 tax season, the Community Action Project of
Tulsa County (CAPTC) partnered with D2D Fund (D2D) to deliver
the Refunds to Assets (R2A) program. CAPTC is a large community
action agency based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, providing a variety of ser-
vices, including housing assistance, child care, health services, emer-
gency food and financial assistance, and individual development
accounts (IDAs).16 CAPTC also provides free tax preparation to low-
income households. In 2002, volunteers completed about 14,300 federal
returns. D2D Fund (www.d2dfund.org) is a non-profit organization
dedicated to improving the delivery of financial services to low-income
families and focused on the development and testing of innovative fi-
nancial products and services.17
Clients at two of CAPTC's free tax preparation sites were invited to
split their refunds, sending part to a savings account via direct deposit
and arranging to receive the rest by mail as a check. We enlisted Bank
of Oklahoma (BOk) as a partner so that participants could open new
BOk savings accounts without leaving the tax preparation site.18 To be
eligible, clients had to be at least 18 years old, have an expected federal
tax refund, and agree to a set of legal authorizations'9 In addition,
clients wishing to open a savings account with BOk had to pass a
credit-check system used by the bank (ChexSystems) and have a valid
driver's license or passport.
The pilot program was offered in two time periods during the tax
season, during the first two weeks of February (the peak season for fil-
ing by those expecting refunds) and for two weeks in March. Recruit-
ment and enrollment occurred on-site, while individuals were waiting
to meet with tax preparers.2° CAPTC staff and/or a member of our re-Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 123
search team approached groups of CAPTC clients who were waiting to
meet with tax preparers. They used a prepared script to describe R2A,
emphasizing the program as a tool to split refunds and to encourage
saving. Next, in one-on-one conversations, staff explained legal and
research authorizations and collected preliminary information from
those who did and did not wantto participate. Individuals wanting to
open BOk accounts completed a short form. Generally, at this point,
potential participants began their tax preparation appointments while
program staff opened accounts for those who requested them. Near
the end of the tax preparation appointment, interested clients com-
pleted the R2A enrollment process and gave detailed written instruc-
tions for how their refunds should be divided. Although the script
encouraged people to split their refunds, individuals who wanted to
open new BOk accounts and deposit their entire refunds into these
accounts were allowed to do so. Depending on filing date and on IRS
processing times, the savings portion was directly deposited into the
new BOk account or the participant's existing account about ten to
fourteen days after the date of tax filing, and the participant received
the remainder as a check shortly thereafter.
We collected data from three different groups:
Takers-137 individuals at the two CAPTC test sites who expected
to receive refunds and who attempted to sign up for the program.
These were subsequently divided into two subgroups: seventy-nine
who ended up participating (participants), and fifty-eight who sought
to participate but were unable to usually because they did not pass the
BOk credit screen (foiled participants).
DeclinersApproximately 379 individuals at the two test sites who
expected refunds but were not interested in participating in R2A.
Comparison groupfifty-three individuals at a CAPTC tax prepara-
tion site where R2A was not available who said that they would have
participated in R2A had the program been offered. By design, this
group had similar motives as the R2A participants, although they did
not have the benefit of the program.
We collected several different sources of information (see table 4.2).
Takers, decliners, and members of the comparison group completed
a short written baseline survey during the enrollment process. For
takers, this survey included questions about demographic character-
istics, current savings, and planned refund uses. For decliners, this
survey asked about demographic characteristics and reasons for124 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.2
Response Rates per Data Source by Research Samplea
afr.formation was collected from a number of sources for individuals approached on site
by R2A program staff. All individuals were asked to complete a baseline survey, and in-
formation from a Taxwise summary sheet was collected for all decliners and takers. In-
formation was also collected from the splitting instructions issued by those participants
opting to split their refunds. Follow-up telephone surveys were conducted 3-5 months
after refund receipt with participants and members of the comparison group. Finally,
BOk provided account data for select participants. Data collected 2/9-2/21 and 3/15-3/
26 of 2004 in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and 5/30-8/12 by telephone from Boston, Massachusetts.
bCalculated as the number of participants with data divided by the total number of par-
ticipants signing research consent forms (n = 75). Four participants who did not com-
plete research consent forms are excluded.
declining. For the comparison group, the baseline survey asked about
demographic and financial characteristics as well as planned refund
uses.2' Data on anticipated refund amount and adjusted gross income
(AGI) were collected for takers and decliners from a summary infor-
mation page generated by the Taxwise tax preparation software. Data
on how R2A participants allocated their refunds between savings
deposits and checks were taken from the refund-splitting instructions
issued on site.
In addition to these baseline data, R2A participants and members of
the comparison group were asked to complete a fifteen-minute phone
survey three to five months after they received their refunds. Fifty-five
percent of participants and 49 percent of comparison group members
completed this follow-up survey. In total sixty-three respondents were
successfully contacted, forty-one participants and twenty-two compar-
ison group members. The survey included questions on actual refund
use, satisfaction with R2A (for participants), and interest in similar
services and products.
Before we discuss the research findings, we acknowledge some
important research limitations: we studied a relatively small number
of individuals in a single city under particular research conditions,
Taxwise
Baseline Summary Splitting Follow-up
Data Source Survey Page InstructionsSurvey
Takers 99% 95% NA NA
Participantsb 100% 99% 83% 55%
Foiled 97% 89% NA NA
Decliners 63% 65% NA NA
Comparison group 87% NA NA 49%Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 125
and therefore we cannot be confident that our results are generalizable.
However, given the paucity of research on this topic, even this small
study may be useful in understanding the potential of refund splitting.
One can think of our results as akin to a test market approach to re-
search, as used by business marketers, where consumers are exposed
to a product or service to gauge their likely reception.
We organize our discussion of the research findings in the next sec-
tion around five topics:
Is there demand for refund splitting? What is the apparent take-up
rate of refund splitting, and what are structural impediments to in-
creasing take-up?
Who participated? What are the characteristics of participants?
Why did people choose to participate? What goals were participants
trying to reach?
What was the immediate impact of the program on savings?
After a few months, did participants have better saving outcomes
than the comparison group?
We defer a discussion of the sixth set of findings, regarding partici-
pants' thoughts about alternative splitting options, to the final section
of the paper, where we discuss the implications of our research.
4.Baseline Research Findings from the R2A Program
4.1Take-Up and Participation Rates
Table 4.3 summarizes information regarding the take-up rate for
the R2A program at the two Tulsa sites. In brief, about 27 percent of
refund recipients sought to participate in the R2A program (takers);
15 percent were able to participate (participants) and the remainder
were "foiled" because they did not meet various eligibility standards,
as described below. These figures represent our estimates of the de-
mand for the R2A version of an asset-building strategy leveraging tax
refunds. As we describe below, a more conservative estimate of the po-
tential and actual demand for splitting alone would be 21 percent and
12 percent, respectively.
To determine potential demand, we divided the number of people
who enrolled or attempted to enroll by the number of refund recipients
approached by the staff. R2A program staff approached 556 indi-
viduals about enrolling in R2A during the four weeks the service




Take-up rateprogram1' 137 27
Take-up rate_splittingc 110 21
Take-up ratenew account 98 19
Participation rate_programe 79 15
Participation ratesplittings 62 12
Participation ratenew account5 55 11
Disqualification rateprogram' 58 11
Declined 379 73
a Individuals who were approached at the tax preparation site (n = 516) have been
grouped into several categories: those who enrolled in the program, those who wanted
to enroll in the program but could not, and those who declined to enroll. The first two of
these groups are combined to form the group "Interested in Program." These individuals
are referred to as "takers." The take-up rate, defined as the percentage of those
approached on site expecting a refund who were interested in the program, is also pre-
sented. Take-up rates are estimated for the program as a whole (splitting and account
opening), for splitting, and for account opening. Participation rate is defined as the per-
centage of those approached on site expecting a refund who successfully enrolled in
the program. Participation rates are estimated for the program as a while, for splitting,
and for account opening. Data collected 2/9-2/21 and 3/15-3/26 of 2004 in Tulsa,
Oklahoma.
group includes those who actually enrolled in the program (participants) and those
who were interested in enrolling but were ineligible (foiled participants).
cTake..up rate for splitters is calculated by multiplying the percentage of participants
splitting their refunds (83%) by the number of foiled participants (n = 58), adding that
number to the number of successful splitters (n = 62), and then dividing that total by the
number of individuals approached who were expecting a refund (n = 512 and excludes
four participants who did not sign research consent forms).
d Take-up rate for new accounts is calculated following the same method as described
above but for new accounts instead of splitters.
a This group includes individuals who successfully enrolled in the program.
"Participation rate for splitting is calculated as the number of splitters (n = 62) divided by
the number of individuals approached expecting refunds (n = 512).
g Participation rate for new accounts is calculated as the number of individuals opening
new accounts (n = 55) divided by the number of individuals approached expecting
refunds (n = 512).
hTMs group includes individuals who wanted to enroll in the program but were not eli-
gible. See table 4.4 in this paper.
This group includes those who were approached by CAPTC staff about enrolling, but
declined to participate. See table 4.6 in this paper for a more detailed explanation.Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 127
Table 4.4




Wanted to enroll 58 42
ChexSystems1' 36 26
Declined to waitc 6 4
Refund too small in the endd 6 4
Lacked proper identificatione 4 3
Underage 3 2
Did not have existing account numberg 2 1
Paper return error1' 1 1
a Some individuals who expressed interest in the program were unable to enroll. The per-
centage of all takers who either enrolled or were disqualified for specific reasons is
shown in the table. Data collected 2/9-2/21 and 3/15-3/26 of 2004 in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
bThis category includes the individuals denied accounts, and thus participation in the
program, by ChexSystems.
cwaithlg time to complete enrollment in the program during very busy periods could be
as long as 15-20 minutes; some clients declined to wait.
dinterested individuals began the enrollment process before learning the value of their
refund; some individuals ultimately decided that their refunds were too small to make
splitting worthwhile.
ein order to open an account, BOk required a valid driver's license issued at least 3
months prior to the account-opening date.
In order to open a non-custodial account, BOk required that the account-holder be at
least 18 years old.
51n order to split a refund between a check and an existing account, individuals needed
to know the account number of their existing savings account.
hNeariy all individuals enrolling in the program filed electronically. Although it would
have been possible to enroll in R2A even if paper-filing, one individual was mistakenly
turned away for this reason.
number serves as the denominator for take-up and participation rates
and equals the takers plus decliners. Of these 516, 137 wanted to enroll
in the program, producing an estimated take-up rate of 27 percent.
Fifty-eight of the would-be enrollees (11 percent of the 516 eligible
individuals) were turned away. Excluding these individuals from the
numerator yields a participation rate of 15 percent, considerably above
the 2 percent rate experienced by H&R Block, mentioned above.22
Table 4.4 gives reasons for disqualification. While some takers were
foiled by lack of identification or age requirements, the most severe
constraint was that individuals who wanted to open a BOk account
had to pass BOk's ChexSystems standard. ChexSystems is a credit-128 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
screening device used by approximately 90 percent of bank branches
nationwide (Quinn 2001). Subscribing banks use the product in two
ways: as a reporting mechanism for current clients who have had
problems using their accounts, often in the form of overdrafts or
bounced checks, and as a data source to check the financial histories of
potential new account-holders. Our team failed to ask BOk to waive
ChexSystems requirements, and as a result, BOk's default rules were
in place. The bank would not open a savings account for any individ-
ual with a ChexSystems record.23 This policy disqualified 26 percent of
the individuals who wanted to enroll in the program.
Finally, we consider the actual demand for splitting alone. The R2A
program allowed participants to split their refunds and to open new
accounts. Among participants, 56 percent split to a new account, 27
percent split to an existing account, and 17 percent simply opened a
new account and deposited all of their federal refund in it (even
though this was not the intent of the program). If we exclude partici-
pants who did not use splitting services, then the potential and actual
take-up rates are reduced to 21 percent and 12 percent, respectively.
All of the take-up and participation rates discussed thus far assume
that participants split their refunds because they perceived value in
dividing their refunds into portions for spending and saving and in be-
ing able to precomrnit to saving. However, it is possible that partici-
pants split for other reasons, and if this is the case, the take-up and
participation rates above may overestimate the demand for splitting.
First, participants may have split because they believed it was a pre-
requisite for account opening. The R2A outreach emphasized splitting,
and some may have split simply to gain access to the BOk account.
This interpretation has some support: in response to an open-ended
question, 15 percent of the thirty-three splitters who completed the
follow-up survey reported that opening an account was their primary
reason for splitting. (Follow-up methods, response rate, and data are
discussed in detail below.) On the other hand, the 17 percent who
chose not to split their refunds recognized that splitting was not
required.
Second, participants who opened new accounts and split their
refunds may have been interested in both program features but may
have been more interested in account opening. In the follow-up survey,
more than 70 percent of those who split into new accounts (n = 22)
reported that opening a new account was more important to them
than splitting their refund. However, the fact these participants valuedSplitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 129
account opening over splitting does not necessarily mean that their
interest in splitting was insignificant. In fact, in the follow-upsurvey,
94 percent of participants who said that account openingwas more
important than splitting said that they planned to split againnext
year.
Third, when asked why they split, a substantial share of splitters
gave reasons that did not obviously and directly relate to splitting or
physical/mental accounting. Fourteen percent of splitters said that
they did so because of an interest in trying somethingnew, 6 percent
said they split to receive their refund faster, and 14 percentgave mis-
cellaneous reasons (e.g., "because of the business"or "it just sounded
like a good thing to do"). Another 18 percent of respondentsgave a re-
sponse that spoke broadly about saving without specifically referring
to splitting (e.g., "to save for car insurance" or "just to have extra cash
in case I ever run out"). These responses may indicate that people split
because they believed splitting would help themsave. However, if a
participant believed that having a new account would help himsave
and that individual split simply to open an account, then thistype of
response could reveal perceived benefits of account-opening rather
than perceived benefits of splitting. To the extent that R2A participants
split simply to gain other benefits (most notablyaccess to a savings ac-
count), even our estimates of 21 percent (potential take-up) and 12per-
cent (actual take-up) for splitting alone are biased upward.
4.2Characteristics of Subgroups
Table 4.5 reports demographic characteristics of the various sub-
groups, including participants, foiled participants, takers, and de-
cliners. Where possible, it also describes residents of Tulsa County.
We begin by summarizing characteristics of participants. Participants
had an average age of 35, were predominantly female, andwere pre-
dominantly African-American or Caucasian. Their federal tax refunds
averaged $1,381. Over half of participants held full-time jobs, and
more than three-quarters worked at least part-time. However, 12 per-
cent of respondents were unemployed and currently looking for work,
a figure that was twice the national unemployment rate The average
adjusted gross income (AGI) was $12,297. Overall, participants might
be described as the working poor.
The last four columns of table 4.5 indicate whether participantsare
different from foiled participants and whether takersare different from
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ways. Foiled participants were younger on average and had smaller
average expected refunds than participants. They were also less likely
to be white and more likely to be Hispanic and African-American.
Compared to decliners, takers (foiled and actual participants) tended
to be younger and to have less income. They were more likely to have
children, more likely to have never been married, and less likelyto
have health insurance. The mean ACT for takerswas $11,177, com-
pared to $13,927 for decliners. In short, those who wanted to partici-
pate were probably among the least financially stable households. This
evidenceespecially regarding incomeis broadly consistent with the
early evidence on IDAs, where one study has found that saving rates
were highest among the lowest-income participants.25 If the ability to
open a bank account was part of R2A's appeal (discussed in detail be-
low), then this finding may reveal i.mmet demand for low-fee bank
accounts by low-income working households.
4.3Stated Reasons for Declining and Participating
In our baseline survey, we asked decliners why theywere not inter-
ested in R2A. The question was closed-ended with an open-ended
"other" option. Explanations for disinterest in R2A fall into two broad
categories: "I don't need the service" or "1 don't like the service" (see
table 4.6). Ninety-four percent of respondents gave an answer thatwe
classified in the first category. Forty-four percent of decliners said that
they had already decided how to use their refund, and another 24
percent said that they planned to spend all of their refunds. Looking
forward, we believe that some of those who said that they did not
need the service might use it under other circumstances. Tulsa'secon-
omy was weak in early 2004,26 and our conversations with tax filers
revealed many cases of unemployment and unusual financial difficul-
ties that prevented them from saving at all. In better economic times,
some of these decliners might choose to split.
A much smaller percentage (9 percent) of decliners gaveresponses
that we classified as "don't like the service." Some (4 percent) sought
to have matching funds linked with the service or to deposit in an
investment product dedicated to a specific purpose,27 and others (2
percent) expressed concerns about the security and reliability of the
processing system used to split refunds. Both of these concerns could
be addressed in the future by offering additional savings choicesor by
implementing the system more simply, as would happen if the IRS
were to enable refund recipients to split their refunds. Finally, 2134 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.6
Number and Percentage of Decliners Naming Reasons for Declininga
a individuals who declined to participate in R2A, despite expecting a refund, gave a num-
ber of reasons for choosing not to enroll. These specific reasons have been groupedinto
the broad categories of "don't need the service" and "don't like the service."Individuals
were permitted to give more than one response, so percentages sumto more than one
100"/o. Data collected 2/9-2/21 and 3/15-3/26 of 2004 in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
bmds group includes individuals who stated that they had an existing savings account
with another bank and thus were not interested in opening a new savings accountwith
BOk. Presumably, these individuals did not see a value in the splitting service alone.
"Several individuals began the enrollment process, but after talking withCAPTC staff,
they decided to direct deposit their entire refunds into existing savings accounts.
dindividuals in this group stated that they would have been interested in the splitting
program if additional incentives, such as a match oradditional saving options, were
available.
A number of individuals said that they did not want to participate because they were
moving away from the Tulsa area. Several of these individuals did not want to open a
new bank account with BOk, since they were leavingthe area, and several noted that
they were planning to close existing accounts and did not want to makeadditional
deposits to those accounts. These responses essentially address portability concerns.
A few individuals decided not to participate based on a distrust of banking institutions
generally or a desire to limit the number of parties involved with the processing oftheir
refund to ensure their privacy.
Number Percentage
"Don't need the service" 285 94
Already decided how to use refund 132 44
Plan to spend entire refund 74 24
Refund too small to bother 37 12
Don't need help saving or managing money 28 9
Already have account" 11 4
Began process but sent all to savings" 3 1
"Don't like the service" 26 9
Interested if there was a match or dedicated used 12 4
Moving awaye 7 2
Trust/privacy issues 5 2
Other 34 11Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 135
percent said that they did not want to participate because they were
moving away. Therefore, they did not want to open new accountsor
make additional deposits into soon-to-be-closed accounts.
In our follow-up survey, we asked participants why they chose to
participate in R2A. As noted above, the most common reason respon-
dents gave for splitting their refunds was to separate their refunds into
spending and saving portions (27 percent). Participants also reported
that they chose to split in order to save (18 percent), to avoid spending
all of the refund (12 percent), to try something new (15 percent), and fi-
nally because they wanted to open an account (15 percent). Respon-
dents who opened new accounts listed a desire to save (29 percent) as
the leading reason for account opening. One-quarter of respondents
reported that they had wanted a savings account, and 16 percent said
that they opened an account simply because they were offered one.
The BOk brand had some currency among this population, with 19
percent citing it as the primary reason they opened an account, the
same share that chose to open an account because of the terms offered.
When all account openers were asked about these specific account fea-
hires, the largest share of respondents reported that the convenience of
opening an account on site was most important to them (44 percent).
The waiver of minimum balance requirements (13 percent) and fees
(13 percent), as well as the opportunity to earn interest on savings (13
percent) also attracted many participants. Fewer participants were
drawn in by the faster processing time for refunds deposited into bank
accounts (9 percent) or using their tax refund as the opening balance (6
percent).
The motives of participants may also be understood through the lens
of their planned refund uses and, more concretely, their immediate
savings goals. In the baseline survey, we asked participants if they
planned to spend, save, or repay debt with their refunds and then
used open-ended questions to probe for more specific plans in each of
these categories. We grouped these open-ended comments into various
categories. For example, people could report that they planned to use
refunds to pay rent (spending), to make mortgage payments (debtre-
payment), or to save for a future home (savings). We classified all three
as housing-related refund uses, but only the last would be classified as
a savings goal.
The first three columns of table 4.7 summarize planned refund uses
for participants. Savings uses made up the largest single grouping of
planned uses. Eighty-one percent of participants planned to save part136 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.7
Percentage of Participants and Comparison Group Members Reporting Types of Planned
Refund Use by Method of Usea
a Participants and comparison group members reported a wide variety of planned refund
uses. Respondents were asked if they planned to save partof their refund, spend part,
and/or repay debt with part. The first row of the table shows the percentage of partici-
pants naming any planned refund uses in each of these broad categories. The percentages
sum to more than 100% because participants could namemultiple methods of use.
Respondents also provided information on specific planned uses. The percentage of par-
ticipants reporting each specific refund use by method is presented in rows 2 to 22. Data
collected 2/9-2/21 and 3/15-3/26 of 2004 in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
bincludes home purchase, home improvement, and rental housing uses.
Includes car purchase, car repair, and other car-related uses (such as insurance).
dincludes tuition and school supplies.
eincludes trips, gifts, and events such as weddings and funerals.
lncludes food purchases and other general household expenses.
glncludes financial transactions between family members, including repaying of debt
and making loans and gifts.
Participants (n = 69) Comparison (n = 36)
Save Spend Repay Save Spend Repay
Any 81% 57% 45% 56% 58% 56%
General saving 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Emergency saving 13% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0%
Housing1' 15% 9% 1% 13% 6% 0%
Carc 13% 12% 4% 8% 11% 6%
Education' 4% 1% 1% 0% 8% 0%
Business 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Retirement 5% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0%
Children 4% 4% 1% 0% 2% 0%
Special eventse 4% 1% 0% 6% 0% 0%
Bifis 3% 19% 13% 0% 2% 2%
Medical 1% 1% 3% 0% 0% 9%
Durables 1% 4% 1% 0% 4% 2%
Moving expenses 1% 4% 0% 0% 2% 0%
Living expenses 1% 0% 1% 0% 8% 0%
Miscellaneous 7% 1% 3% 0% 2% 4%
Credit cards 0% 0% 12% 0% 0% 13%
Utilities 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 2%
Loans 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 2%
Clothes 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Taxes 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6%
Family transfers5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 137
of their refund, with 57 percent and 45 percent planning spending
or debt repayment, respectively. As expected in a splitting program,
participants planned multiple and varied uses for their refunds. Specif-
ically, 41 percent of participants planned botha savings and a spend-
ing use; 32 percent planned a savings and a debt-repaymentuse; 17
percent planned a spending and a debt-repayment use; and 16 percent
planned a savings, a spending, and a debt-repayment use (resultsnot
shown).
Because R2A aimed to encourage saving, we paid special attention
to planned savings uses. The most common savings goal, named by 16
percent of participants, was "general" saving, including responses like
"to build savings," or "just to have money." The next mostcommon
savings goals were saving for housing-related uses (15 percent, mostly
for home purchase but also for home improvement), saving foremer-
gencies (13 percent), and vehicle-related saving (13 percent, mostlycar
purchase and car repair). Retirement saving, a major focus of public
policy, was mentioned by only 5 percent of participants. Thismay indi-
cate that participants have more immediate savings needs; however,
these same people might become interested in saving for retirement
in future years. It is also possible that the product choice available
in R2Aa simple savings account best suited to short-term savings
rather than an IRAdid not appeal to filers planning tosave for
retirement.
4.4Initial Savings Amounts
The initial savings that the R2A program generatedcan be bench-
marked in three ways: in dollars per participant, asa percentage of re-
fund amount, and as a fraction of pre-program savings. Byany of these
measures, R2A participants initially saved a substantial amount. See
table 4.8 for data on initial deposits to savings. Themean (median) par-
ticipant directed $606 ($203) into savings. This represented 47 percent
(39 percent) of her refund. Combining baseline survey dataon existing
savings with data on amount of refund sent to savings shows the im-
mediate effect of R2A on household savings. On a per capita basis,sav-
ings increased from $276 before the receipt of refunds to $863 after
refund receipt. This change represented a $587per capita increase, 213
percent growth.28
Participants contain two interesting subgroups: one subgroup report-
ing some savings before the program and a second reportingno prior
savings. Individuals with existing savings had larger refunds and138 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.8
Aggregate Initial Saving out of Refunda
a Data on total and individual measures of amount of refund sent to savings are pre-
sented below for all participants, all participants who split their refunds, andall partici-
pants who opened new accounts. Data collected 2/9-2/21 and3/15-3/26 of 2004 in
Tulsa, Oklahoma.
'Calculated as the mean of individual savings as a percentage of refund.
directed a larger portion (mean = 60 percent) of their refunds to sav-
ings accounts. In contrast, greenfield saversindividualswithout ex-
isting savingsreceived smaller reftmds and directed less to savings
(mean = 42 percent). With smaller refunds and smaller sharesdirected
to savings, greenfield savers sent an averageof $479 to savings versus
$924 by existing savers. These values represent an infinite and a90 per-
cent increase in savings for the two groups, respectively.In both cases,
the increase in savings was large, at least initially.
5.Follow-Up Results
In this section, we use available data to examine whetherR2A seemed
to help participants save part of their refundsand meet specific savings
goals. As noted above, we conducted a follow-up telephone interview
of R2A participants and comparison group members three tofive
months after refund receipt. Forty-one (55 percent) of theseventy-five










Amount sent to savings
Mean $606 $579 $490
Standard deviation $905 $883 $1,011
Median $203 $200 $174
Minimum $3 $15 $3
Maximum $4,000 $4,000 $4,000
Amount sent to savings as a
percentage of anticipated refund
Meanb 47% 38% 46%
Standard deviation 33% 27% 36%
Median 39% 33% 35%
Minimum 2% 2% 2%
Maximum 100% 98% 100%Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 139
group members completed this interview.29 To assess comparability
between these samples, panel A of table 4.9 shows demographic char-
acteristics of the baseline and follow-up samples, for participants and
comparison group members. Panel B of table 4.9 shows plannedre-
fund uses for these four samples.
The follow-up participant sample is quite similar demographically
to the baseline participant sample. The most notable differencesare
related to home ownership, employment, andrace. Members of the
follow-up sample were less likely than those in the baseline sampleto
own homes (25 percent versus 31 percent). They were more likely to
work full-time (67 percent versus 60 percent) and to be white (44per-
cent versus 39 percent). Planned refund uses are also quite similar for
these two groups, with one exception: the follow-up samplewas less
likely to name a planned spending use than the baseline sample (49
percent versus 57 percent).
Differences between the follow-up sample of participants and
the follow-up comparison sample are more pronounced. Comparison
group members were much more likely to own homes (56 percent
versus 25 percent) and to be female (88 percent versus 59 percent).
Comparison group members also had higher incomes. All of these dif-
ferences are statistically significant. Other differences approach statisti-
cal significance: comparison group members were more likelyto be
white (65 percent versus 44 percent), they had less education, and they
had smaller anticipated refunds.3° (Actual refund amountswere quite
similar for the two groups.) With the exception of education, thecom-
parison sample appears to be more advantaged than the participant
sample.
If one assumes that the advantaged sample ismore likely to save
part of their refunds and meet specific savings goals, then demo-
graphic characteristics suggest that comparisons between the follow-
up participant and comparison samples represent a conservative test
of the impact of R2A. Data on planned refund use complicatematters,
however. The follow-up comparison sample was less likely than the
follow-up participant sample to name a planned savingsuse (63 per-
cent versus 82 percent) and more likely to name spending and debt
repayment uses. Differences in savings and repayment goals approach
statistical significance. If these observed differencesare not due to
chance, they may represent individual differences not captured by the
demographic variables. Or they may suggest that R2A hadan immedi-
ate impact on planned refund uses. The latter is consistent with the fact140 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.9
Demographic Characteristics and Planned Reftmd Uses for Participantsand Comparison
Group Members in the Baseline and Follow-upSamplesa
Participants Comparison
PFCF
Baseline Follow-upFollow-up Baseline p-Value
Panel A: demographic characteristics
Ageb
Mean 35 36 37 No data 0.62
Standard deviation 13 12 17 No data
Median 32 34 41 No data
Income ranges:
$0-$10,000 50% 51% 15% 30% 0.02
$10,001-$20,000 24% 22% 50% 32%
$20,001+ 26% 27% 35% 39%
Refund anticipatedd
Mean $1,381 $1,362 $775 $958 0.15
Standard deviation $1,446 $1,567 $769 $1,080
Median $648 $624 $500 $500
Refund received
Mean No data $1,377 $1,299 No data 0.84
Standard deviation No data $1,536 $1,208 No data
Median No data $704 $700 No data
Children in
householde 52% 51% 50% 40% 0.86
Receives public
assistance 27% 24% 17% 29% 0.58
Has health
insurance 45% 45% 56% 64% 0.51
Owns home 31% 25% 56% 53% 0.05
Gender
Female 57% 59% 88% 76% 0.03
Male 43% 41% 12% 24%
Marital status
Currently married 16% 15% 10% 20% 0.64
Not married 84% 85% 90% 80%
Employment status
Working full-time 60% 67% 58% 570/s 0.51
Not working full-
time 40% 33% 42% 43%
(continued)Note: Sample sizes varies across variables due to missing data.
a Data on participants and comparisongroup members are presented for all individuals
in each group with baseline data and for individuals in eachgroup who completed a
follow-up interview. The table reports demographic and financial information formem-
bers of each subgroup and compares the characteristics of baseline and follow-up partici-
pants and the characteristics of baseline and follow-up comparison group members. In
addition, the last two columns give the results of statistical tests (including chi-square,
Fisher's exact, and t-tests) comparing follow-up comparison group members to follow-
up participants. Fisher's exact tests are two-sided.
bFor participants, dataon age are taken from Taxwise summary sheets. Comparison
group data on age come from follow-up surveys and so are available only for compari-
son group members contacted on follow-up.
CData on comparison group members' incomes were reportedon the baseline survey in
ranges. For participants, income equals AGI as reported on summary Taxwise page and
then converted to ranges.
dAsiricipated refund for participants is taken fromTaxwise summary sheets. Anticipated
refund data for comparison group members is from baselinesurveys completed by
respondents prior to having their taxes prepared.
ePercentage of respondents in eachgroup reporting children under the age of 18 in
household.
Percentage of respondents in each group reporting currently receiving TANF, SSI,or
food stamps.





Baseline Follow-upFollow-up Baseline p-Value
Education
Some college or
more 49% 48% 25% 51% 0.09
High school





Hawaiian, or other 61% 56% 35% 42% 0.12
White 39%
Panel B: planned uses of refund
44% 65% 58%
Savings 81% 82% 63% 56% 0.12
Debt repayment 45% 45% 68% 56% 0.09
Spending 57% 49% 58% 58% 0.51
n 75 41 22 53142 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
that the program was presented as a tool to encouragesaving and the
assumption that participants enrolled in the programbecause they
believed it would in fact facilitate saving.
5.1Saving Outcomes for Participant and Comparison Groups
Our first evidence on the short-term impactof R2A comes from com-
paring saving outcomes for the participant and comparison groups.
We present data separately for planned savers (i.e.,those who named
a savings goal at baseline) andfor all respondents. Limiting the sample
to planned savers may reduce bias caused bydifferences in planned re-
fund use across the two samples. In table 4.10, the outcomeof interest
is money from refunds still held in savings. Amongplanned savers, 72
percent of participants said that they were stillsaving part of their
refunds, compared to 42 percent of the comparison group.This differ-
ence is statistically significant atthe .10 level. Among all follow-up
respondents, 66 percent of participants were still saving,compared
to 36 percent of the comparison group.This difference is statistically
significant at the .05 level. Mean differences in amount ofrefund still
saved, either in dollar terms or as a percentageof the total refund
amount, are not significant.
Next, we broaden our outcome measure to includeusing the refund
on at least one stated savingsgoal, in addition to continuing to save a
portion of the refund. A person who planned to save topurchase a car
and, at follow-up, had done so would meet this broaderdefinition of
success. Someone who planned to savefor the future and used part of
her refund for an emergency also meets this definition.Table 4.11
shows that 78 percent of planned savers in the participant group were
still saving some portion of their refund or had spentit on a stated
savings goal. In the comparison group, 42 percentof planned savers
met this criterion. Among all follow-uprespondents (not just planned
savers), 71 percent of participants met this criterion,compared to 36
percent of the comparison group. Both differences aresignificant at the
.05 level. Again, mean differences in amountof refund still saved or
spent on a savings goal are not significant. In sum,evidence regarding
the short-term impact of R2A on saving part of a refundand achieving
savings goals is positive but somewhat mixed: participants were more
likely than comparison group members to save andspend on savings
goals, but amounts saved and spent on savingsgoals did not differ
significantly.Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 143
Table 4.10
Saving out of Refund at Follow-up, for Participant and Comparison Groupsa
Planned Saversb All Respondentsc
Partici- Com- PC Partici- Corn- PC
pants parisonp-Valuepants parisonp-Value
a Saving outcomes for participants and comparisongroup members are compared. The
percentage of participants who planned to save and are still saving three to five months
later is compared to that share of comparison group members doingso. The percentage
of all participants (not just planned savers) who are stifi saving is also comparedto the
share of comparison group members doing so. Data on the amount of refund stillsaved
and the percentage of the refund received still saved are presented for both plannedsav-
ers and all follow-up respondents. CM-square, Fisher's exact, and t-tests are used to test
for significant differences among the groups. Fisher's exact testsare one-sided.
bPlanned savers are those who nameda planned savings use of their refunds on the
baseline survey.
CAll respondents include those who completeda follow-up interview, regardless of
whether they listed a planned savings use on the baseline survey.
dRef.d equals actual, not anticipated, refundamount.
Percentage still
saving portion
of refund 72% 42% 0.06 66% 36% 0.03
Amount saved
Mean $423 $318 0.75 $338 $278 0.78
Standard
deviation $1,041 $596 $931 $550
Median $50 $0 $35 $0
Minimum $0 $0 $0 $0
Maximum $4,000 $2,000 $4,000 $2,000
Percentage of
refund savedd
Mean 24% 21% 0.72 21% 19% 0.74
Standard
deviation 31% 29% 29% 28%
Median 11% 0% 8% 0%
Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0%
Maximum 100% 83% 100% 83%
n 32 12 41 22144 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.11
Saving out of Refund or Spending on Savings Goals atFollow-up, for Participant and
Comparison Groupsa
a Saving outcomes for participant and comparison groups are compared, first forplanned
savers, then for all respondents. CM-square,Fisher's exact, and I-tests are used to test for
significant differences between the groups. Fisher's exact tests are one-sided.
bplanned savers are defined as those who named a planned savings use of their refunds
on the baseline survey.
CAll respondents include all individuals who completed a follow-up interview,regard-
less of whether they listed a planned savings use on the baseline survey.


















on savings goal 78% 42% 0.02 71% 36% 0.01
Amount saved
or spent on
savings goals 0.80 0.88
Mean $472 $568 $376 $415
Standard
deviation $1,065 $1,192 $956 $943
Median $53 $0 $50 $0
Minimum $0 $0 $0 $0





Mean 32% 27% 0.66 27% 22% 0.56
Standard
deviation 36% 37% 34% 32%
Median 13% 0% 10% 0%
Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0%
Maximum 100% 98% 100% 98%
n 32 12 41 22Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 145
5.2Bank-Level Account Data
In addition to self-reported data,we obtained bank balance and
transaction data for participants from the Bank of Oklahoma. BOk
provided individual data for participants who eitheropened new
savings accounts with BOk or who split their refundsinto existing
BOk accounts. The data include account status, monthlyaccount bal-
ance information for August through November 2004, limitedac-
count-level data on transactions, and household-level dataon the
ownership of BOk products. These datawere not available for compar-
ison group members.
B01 located account data for fifty-eight out of the sixty-sixindividu-
als who either opened an account with BOkor split to an existing
account. (These fifty-eight individuals represent 77 percent of all
R2A participants.) Of these fifty-eight, 62 percent still hadactive BOk
accounts by mid-August 2004, but 38 percent had closed their
accounts, either at their request or due to bank policy, which closes
zero-balance accounts. (The bank providedno additional information
on these closed accounts and account-holders.) The 62 percent with
stifi-open accounts kept their accounts open at least through Novem-
ber 2004, when BOk provided data to the researchteam.
Participants with open accounts generally received largerrefunds
and had higher incomes than participants with closedaccounts. Apart
from these differences, there were no significant differencesbetween
the two groups on other demographic variables. Participants withopen
accounts appeared to have greater familiarity with savingsaccounts
(33 percent had a savings account at another financialinstitution, com-
pared to 22 percent of those with closed accounts), but the differenceis
not statistically significant. The two groups appear a]most identical in
terms of R2A services used (splitting, account opening,or both) and
checking account ownership.
For participants who still had accountsopen in November 2004, BOk
provided household-level data on other relationships theseindividuals
had with the bank. As we would expect, all of these householdsowned
some kind of savings vehicle at BOk. (Ninety-seven percent hadsav-
ings accounts, 8 percent had money market accounts, and 3percent
held IRAs at BOk.) Only 16 percent had ATM cards. Halfof the house-
holds had a checking account ofsome kind, including a mix of stan-
dard checking accounts, free or "second chance" checkingaccounts,
and even high-end products with high balance requirements (though

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 147
holders were probably paying account fees). Only 8 percent of these
households held any debt with BOk. (Three percent had installment
loans, and 5 percent had mortgages.)
Some of these checking accounts, debt products, and investment
accounts appear to pre-date the tax season. However, approximately
56 percent of this subset of households did not havea relationship
with BOk prior to the tax season, so the initial savings accountsgener-
ated new customers for the bank. Furthermore, one-quarter of these
new R2A-BOk customers opened additional accounts (beyond the sav-
ings account) following the tax season, suggesting meaningfulcross-
selling opportunities within the R2A participant sample.31
BOk provided end-of-month data on savings account balances for
August, September, October, and November 2004 for accounts remain-
ing open in mid-August. These data show that participants rapidly
withdrew money from their accounts. This subsample of participants
initially deposited an average of $644 into their BOk accounts. The
average balance dropped to $112 by August (twenty-six weeks after
refund receipt for most participants) and to $27 by November (thirty-
eight weeks after refund receipt for most participants). The median
balance of $203 at enrollment dropped to $11 in August and $1 in No-
vember. Although thirty-six accounts were still open in November, at
least sixteen of those might be considered inactive: they had balances
of less than $10 and no activity for at least two months. As detailed in
table 4.12, excluding these inactive accounts from the balance calcula-
tions yields higher average and median balances but a substantially
higher account closure rate.
5.3Saving Outcomes for Participants With and Without R2A
Further evidence on the short-term impact of R2A comes from dataon
saving part of refunds by participants in 2003, the year before R2Awas
available. In the baseline survey, we asked R2A participants whether
they had received a federal refund in the previousyear. We asked
those who did receive a refund in 2003 whether theywere stifi saving
a portion three months after they received their refunds. We compared
these data with data on savings at follow-up in 2004, when partici-
pants used R2A services. We use a McNemar chi-square to test for sig-
nificant differences across time among the participants respondingto
both the baseline question and the follow-up survey (n= 31). Partici-
pants report a higher propensity to save with R2A relative to the prior
year, when R2A was not available, a relationship that is highly signifi-
cant (p < .01).32148 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.13
Responses to Follow-up Survey Attitudinal Questions for Participants, byParticipation
Statusa
Split RefundDid Not
to New or Split (New
Existing Account All
Account Only) Participants
Service helped to save more of
refund
Service helped to spend refund
more slowly
Service helped to resist spending
temptations
Would split next yearb
Would still split even if had to
wait longer for refund'
Would recommend service to a
friend
Average amount willing to pay
to split refund
n
a Participants were asked a series of questions designed to gauge their satisfaction with
R2A and their feelings about the program's effectiveness. Participants werealso asked
several questions about possible future use of a splitting service. Responses arepresented
for participants who split their refunds, for participants who did not split theirrefunds,
and for all participants.
bSplitters were asked if they planned to split their refunds again next year. For non-
splitters, the concept of the splitting service was explained, and they were then askedif
they would split their refunds next year.
CRespondents (both splitters and non-splitters) who stated that they would splittheir
refunds again next year were asked if they would stifi plan to split even if theirrefunds
arrived more slowly as a result. Respondents who did not plan to split next year were
not asked this question.
5.4Participant Perceptions of R2A
A final source of evidence regarding the impact of R2A comesfrom
responses to attitudinal questions included inthe follow-up survey,
displayed in table 4.13. The survey data suggest that R2Afacilitated
saving and thoughtful spending. Eighty-three percent ofrespondents
said that the service helped them save more, 83 percent saidthat the
service helped them spend their refunds more slowly,and 76 percent
said that the service helped them resist spending temptations.In addi-
tion, all respondents said that they would recommendR2A to a friend,
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age, participants were willing to pay $6.60 to split their refunds, and 89
percent were willing to split even if they had to wait longer to receive
their refunds. These results suggest that participants perceived mate-
rial benefits from the service, albeit not necessarily related to long-
term savings goals.
6.Discussion
We wfflingly concede that this research has important limitations. This
is a small study in a single location with a set of taxpayers that may not
be representative of the LMI population in the United States. In addi-
tion, findings related to the impact of the program must be interpreted
very cautiously because individuals were not randomly assigned to
treatment and control groups, and the comparison group examined
here probably differs from the treatment group in important (and
unmeasured) ways. Nevertheless, we offer some tentative conclusions.
Most are best viewed as hypotheses for future study rather thanas
conclusions in their own right. We also suggest some directions for fu-
hire research.
Refund splitting seems to appeal to LMI families. When we began this
experiment, the team was prepared for the possibility that no one
would want to use this new, untested service. We offered peoplea ser-
vice that involved their money, where few had advance notice of the
service, where there was no word of mouth, and where refund recipi-
ents had to fill out additional paperwork in order to participate. We
were surprised that demand was as strong as it was: 27 percent of re-
fund recipients wanted to use the service. Afterwards, almost allpar-
ticipants said they were satisfied with the service and woulduse it
again, and they were wffling to pay an average of $6 for the splitting
service. While it wifi take other experiments at other sites to confirm
these results, our data suggest that refund splitting could meet with
very strong consumer demand among LMI families.
LMI families are most interested in splitting into basic financial products,
but other products have some appeal. In our follow-up survey, we asked
participants which financial products they would like to split into (see
table 4.14). There was greater demand for simpler financial products,
with 92 percent very likely or likely to select a savings account; 88per-
cent, a checking account; and 65 percent, a paper check. There was also
interest in retirement savings products (53 percent); college savings
products (51 percent); and, to a lesser extent, certificates of deposit,150 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Table 4.14
New Splitting Options, Participant Interest in AdditionalProductsa
apartiripants and comparison group members (n = 60) were asked how likely they
would be to split their refunds into a number of different financial products. Respondents
were given four response options: "very likely," "somewhatlikely," "somewhat un-
likely," and "very unlikely." This table aggregates participant and comparison group
member responses and presents the results for the "very likely" and "somewhat likely"
responses, and combines them in the tight-hand column.
bThe stored value card was described to respondents as "a card that you could use at an
ATM/Transfund machine, like a debit card."
savings bonds, and mutual funds.33 Families also expressed ademand
for a splitting service that directly paid down various debts (car loan-
45 percent, credit card-44 percent, and mortgage-42percent). Fi-
nally, more than one-fourth of respondents expressed interest in a
splitting service that would allow them to send international remit-
tances.34 While some of these remittances would likely be spent by
recipients, it appears that some remitted funds are used for assetbuild-
ing, including home construction and improvement (Thompson2002).
Lack of access to low-cost savings vehicles could substantially limit actual
rates of refund splitting by LMI families. In our experiment,participants
either split into existing accounts, split into new accounts, oropened
new accounts without splitting. If wehad limited the service to those






Savings account 66% 26% 92%
Retirement savings 14% 39% 53%
College savings 27% 24% 51%
Certificate of deposit 12% 17% 29%
US savings bond 7% 17% 24%
Mutual fund 9% 12% 21%
Transaction
Checking account 63% 25% 88%
Paper check 25% 40% 65%
Stored value cardb 15% 25% 40%
International remittance 8% 14% 22%
Debt
Car loan 20% 25% 45%
Credit card 32% 12% 44%
Mortgage 25% 17% 42%Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 151
have been considerably lower. In the R2A pilot, only 27 percent of the
participants split into existing accounts, with the remainder opening
accounts. Slicing the data another way shows that the demand
for splitting alone (4 percent) was less than one-half the demand for
splitting coupled with account opening (8 percent). The ChexSystems
screen appears to have been a significant barrier to participation. In
our experiment, potential participants foiled by ChexSystems had com-
pleted almost all of the required paperwork and clearly had strong de-
mand for the service. Had we been able to offer thema savings vehicle,
we could have increased our splitting participation rate from 12 per-
cent to 19 percent.35 While some tax preparation sites have succeeded
in convincing bank partners to waive ChexSystems requirements for
refund depositors, these individual agreements have affecteda rela-
tively small number of filers.
Although BOk did not waive the ChexSystems screen, the bank did
forgo the $100 initial-deposit requirement and the $300 minimum-
balance requirement for participants. This encouraged participation in
R2A, but it will not be possible to take splitting to scale if program
administrators must depend on the goodwifi of individual financial
institutions to waive requirements of this sort.
To implement splitting, one must address material operational concerns,
which might suggest that this process be administered centrally by the IRS.
Our paper primarily deals with the participant experience with the
splitting service, not the operational complexities of offering it. Yet R2A
changed the flow of the tax-preparation site because account opening
required an additional step with different personnel. It also required
monitoring refund transmissions from the IRS, transferring funds
according to splitting instructions, and responding to user inquiries.
While a large commercial preparer could accommodatean R2A-like
program,36 our approach would not work for self-preparersor thinly
staffed tax-preparation sites. As much as one-third of all LMI returns
are self-prepared, and we suspect that a meaningful fraction of the
volunteer tax-preparation sites (which process 1 to 3 percent of LIvil
returns) might be operationally challenged by the requirements to
open accounts on site.37
If splitting is sensible, then from an operational perspective, itcan be
accomplished either at the destination or at the source. Destination-
based splittingin the R2A fashion or as currently offered to higher
net worth customerswould require the participant to instruct her fi-
nancial institution or agent to disburse her refund ina certain fashion152 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
once it was received from the IRS.Source-based splitting would pro-
vide instructions to the sender of the refund, the IRS, to split it tomull-
tiple destinations. Both of these approaches could coexist, but there are
operational considerations that make source-based splitting appealing.
Splitting instructions could be integrated into the taxpreparation
process seamlessly, as just another destinationfor refunds. There
would be no need for private parties to coordinate with the IRS to
track refunds. Perhaps more important for LMI ifiers,source-based
splitting would ensure that the service was available to all,regardless
of the financial institution with which they do business.
Apparently, current policy makers have reached this conclusion.
The Bush administration has included a splitting proposal in itsbudget
for the last two years. On January 31, 2005, twelve members ofCon-
gress wrote to IRS Commissioner Everson,requesting that the IRS
adopt technical changes that would enable splitting. OnMarch 25,
2005, Commissioner Everson replied that the IRS was"working to-
ward making this program available as quickly as possible" and set a
deadline of the 2007 filing season.
This model of refund splitting may provide business opportunities
for private tax preparers. Currently, many private tax preparers,
including large companies such as H&R Block and JacksonHewitt,
but also smaller businesses, derive substantial revenuefrom the
sales of refund-related financial products. To date, these have mostly
included short-term loans, commonly called refund anticipation loans
(RALs), which allow refund recipients to access their fundsseveral
days faster than would be possible with standard direct deposit.While
H&R Block was the first company to offer RALs, they are nowwidely
available, and several of the larger tax preparation firms have begun
to introduce stored value card (SVC) products thatallow refund recip-
ients to receive their funds on a plastic card, similar to a debit card.
Refund splitting could encourage the sale of more than onerefund-
related product to a single consumer. For example, a refund recipient
might purchase an SVC and also open a savings account, splitting her
refund between the two. Multiple-product purchase could both in-
crease revenue and build the relationshipbetween tax preparer and cli-
ent, reducing costly client acquisition activity (Tufanoand Schneider
2005). A well-executed splitting program could also serve as a source
of differentiation in the highly competitive tax preparation sector.
Rather than build a business about accelerating spending, a preparer
could capitalize on its customers desire to slow down spending by say-Splitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 153
ing. One might fear that preparers might offer inferior products to low-
income savers. In part, this concern would be addressed by rules that
'would subject the preparers or their business partners to NASD suit-
abffity rules or "know your customer" regulations in banking, depend-
ing on the type of product they offered to consumers. Competition
could also address this concern in the long run if preparers competed
on the basis of offering attractive savings products. However, savers'
interests could be protected by offering all refund savers a base-
line product that could serve as a floor or default, yet encourage pri-
vate preparers to offer products with terms at least as favorable or
better.
In particular, Tufano and Schneider (2005) discuss permitting refund
recipients to purchase U.S. savings bonds with their refunds. Twenty-
four percent of follow-up survey participants said they would be likely
to purchase savings bonds with part of their refund (table 4.14). An-
other survey question described savings bonds (rather than simply
naming them), and 76 percent of respondents said they would be likely
to purchase bonds.38 While the data suggests that refund recipients
might like to direct their money to many alternatives, this would en-
sure that there was at least one savings alternative available to all. No
customer would be captive to just the products that their preparer
offered. In addition, the savings bond's terms would serve as a lower
bound for any private product. Whether this would spur private sav-
ings products or crowd them out is an empirical question.
There are many opportunities for related research and evaluation. Our
study is admittedly a small-scale experiment, yet it can offer some
hypotheses for future study. In particular, we are intrigued by the
comparison of our results with those obtained in the St. Louis study
(Duflo et al. 2005), cited earlier, which differed from ours in a few key
dimensions. Our experiment uses a simple savings vehicle, whereas
the St. Louls team directed savings into an IRA product. Our experi-
ment provided greater liquidity, while theirs provided less liquidity
and greater precommitment. The two products seem to have appealed
to individuals with differing (though complementary) savings goals.
Many R2A participants reported planning short-term savings for emer-
gencies, while the Express IRA participants generally focused on
longer-term retirement savings. Both are legitimate savings goals.
Our savings program offered little explicit financial inducement to
participate, apart from waiving minimum balance requirements and
monthly fees. The St. Louis experiment provided substantial financial154 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
incentives for participation, in the form of matching funds: Participants
were randomly selected to be offered a 50 percent match, a 20 percent
match, or no match. Those who were not offered a match had the
lowest participation rates (3.3 percent) and contributed the smallest
amount on average ($28). Interestingly, St. Louis filers who were
offered the 50 percent match on the less-liquid IRA product had a very
similar take-up rate (17 percent) compared to participants in the R2A
study (15 percent) who were offered liquid accounts with no match
(Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez 2005). Comparing the two
results may give a sense about the size of the compensation required
to induce long-term savings.
While it may be appropriate to encourage long-term savings, this
cannot come at the expense of acknowledging other shorter-term
savings goals. If we examine the R2A program from the perspective
of consumer satisfaction or self-reported ability to better manage
finances, it looks attractive. Measured narrowly using data on account
balances, the results are far less impressive because balances were rap-
idly drawn down. Our small experiment suggests that this service can-
not be evaluated simply by looking at the size of a participant's bank
balance. While savings account balances dropped significantly over
our nine-month study, participants saved portions of their refunds for
longer periods of time than individuals not offered the service. Perhaps
the relevant measure of success is not account balance, but whether the
participant is making progress towardor has achievedher finan-
cial goals. Emergency saving is a legitimate savings goal for families,
as is saving for auto repair, if that car helps an individual keep his job.
If the program helps participants to weather emergencies or keep their
cars functioning and hence maintain employment, then the program
cannot be judged a failure because savings balances are depleted. Al-
though accumulating and protecting long-term savings (say, for retire-
ment) are important goals, there are other critical savings goals for LMI
families. Any program must be measured against the participants'
goals.
Our results suggest that a program of splitting with account opening
might generate strong interest among LIvil families. By forcing families
to think about their refunds before they receive them, they may find
it easier to save and to resist spending temptations. Participants seem
to have a somewhat betteror no worsepost-refund track record
than other families. Future studies should further test the impact of
programs like R2A, further unbundling the effects of account openingSplitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 155
from splitting. In addition, while we have examined a limited set of
account data, future work should look more closely at account-level
transaction and balance data to understand how low-income filers use
their accounts and the consequences of those use patterns for bank
profitability. More generally, all of these first findings should be repli-
cated with larger samples, where it would be possible to go further, to
understand the product mix, features, and marketing activities that
would best support savings by low- and moderate-income families.
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In fall 2004, all three of the top-selling books on personal finance at Amazon.com
emphasized the concept of "paying yourself first." See Kiyosaki and Lechter (2000), Bach
(2003), and Clason (1988).
We define LMI as having adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than $30,000.
Authors' calculations based on published Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data. The
2001 figures are derived from estimates prepared by the Statistics of Income Division of
the IRS and are based on calendar year. Total refunds is the sum of all refunds to filers
with ACT of less than $30,000.
Authors' calculations based on data from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of In-
come (2001).
Our research project roughly followed the action research cycle of problem definition,
pilot program implementation, evaluation, and re-test. See Lewin (1948) and Kemmis
and McTaggert (1988).
The Bank of Oklahoma is a subsidiary of the Bank of Oklahoma Financial Corpora-
tion (BOKF). BOKF operates banks in Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas, and156 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
Missouri. It is the largest bank in Oklahoma, with $5.9 billion in deposits, more than
twice that of BancFirst, its closest competitor in the market. See www.bokf.com.
See, for example, Schreiner, Clancy, and Sherraden (2002); Sherraden and Barr (2004);
and Hubbard and Skinner (1996).
This decline isless dramatic, though generally still evident, when alternative
approaches to measuring the saving rate are used, such as those employed by Parker
(1999) and Gale, Sabeihaus, and Hall (1999). Borsch-Supan and Lusardi (2003) use data
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to show
that the saving rate in the United States is significantly below that of most European
countries and Japan.
The EITC is available to low-income tax filers (individuals or families) with earnings.
It is intended primarily for parents of children under age 19, but low-income workers
without children may receive a small credit. The amount of the credit initially rises with
earnings, then reaches a plateau, and finally decreases with each additional dollar
earned. See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2004) for details. The maximum
credit for tax year 2003 was $4,204.
The CTC is a federal tax credit for each dependent under age 17. For tax year 2003,
the credit was worth a maximum of $1,000 per child. Filers with taxable earned income
above $10,500 were eligible for a refundable credit. See Lee and Greenstein (2003) for
details. When a credit is refundable, any portion of the credit that exceeds tax liabifity is
transferred to the tax ifier as an income tax refund.
At VITA sites, savings accounts have generally been offered through partnerships be-
tween the community organizations running the tax-preparation sites and banks or credit
unions. The terms of these accounts vary, with financial institutions occasionally waiving
fees, minimum balances, or ChexSystems requirements (discussed in more detail in sec-
tion 4 of this paper). Product marketing differs across programs as well. At some sites,
bank representatives are on-site and actively promote the accounts. At others, VITA staff
may be responsible for selling the accounts and are required to call in to a partner bank to
set up the account remotely. There also appears to le considerable variabifity in the suc-
cess of these programs. Some practitioners have found that few participants are inter-
ested in opening accounts and that those who do open accounts deplete these accounts
quickly; other programs have seen greater success. This assessment is based on phone
interviews with staff from nine free tax-preparation sites and reports from two other tax-
preparation sites. Interviews were conducted during April 2004 with staff at The Balti-
more CASH Campaign (Baltimore, Md.), the Piton Foundation (Denver, Cob.), The
Milwaukee EITC/Asset Building Project (Milwaukee, Wis.), Alternatives Federal Credit
Union (Ithaca, N.Y.), The Central City Asset Building Coalition (New Orleans, La.), The
Riverside Family Asset Building Program (Riverside, Calif.), The United Way of King
County (Seattle, Wash.), The Center for Economic Progress (Chicago, ifi.), The Nehemiah
Gateway CDC (Wilmington, Del.). Reports from the Boston E1TC coalition (Boston,
Mass.) and the Community Food Resource Center (New York, N.Y.) were also used.
In 1998, Richard Thaler and Shiomo Benartzi implemented the first test of the Save
More Tomorrow plan (SMarT) (Thaler and Benartzi 2004). The SMarT plan allowed
workers to precommit to automatically save their 3 percent annual raises in the company
pension plan. Of 286 employees who met with an investment advisor, 162 enrolled in the
program. After twenty-eight months, these employees had increased their saving rates
from an average of 3.5 percent to 11.6 percent of income. A comparison group of employ-
ees who did not precommit to save their raises, but who did agree to try to increase theirSplitting Tax Refunds and Building Savings 157
savings without an automatic feature, increased their saving rates from only 4.4 percent
to 8.7 percent.
Prior to tax filing, would-be splitters file a form with Vanguard outlining the alloca-
tion of their refunds. These ifiers then submit a general Vanguard account number and
routing number on their tax return, and Vanguard automatically splits the refund depos-
ited into this account according to the previously issued instructions. Additional infor-
mation on Vanguard's splitting policy is available at http://flagship2.vanguard.com/
VGApp/hnw/TcDirectDepositController?cbd (accessed March 3, 2004).
This statement is based on phone interviews conducted in March 2004 with represen-
tatives from the nation's ten largest banks and largest mutual funds by assets.
Seventy-two of the 500 largest mutual funds by assets as reported by Morningstar
were Vanguard funds. Of these, only one fund had a minimum initial investment of less
than $1,000.
Individual development accounts were first proposed by Sherraden (1991). They are
matched savings accounts for low-income people and are designed to encourage asset
building.
In the interest of full disclosure, we note that one of the researchers is the founder and
chair of D2D Fund.
These accounts earned the same interest rate as other basic BOk savings accounts (.5
percent per annum at the time of the study). However, BOk waived the $100 opening-
deposit requirement. The bank also waived minimum-balance requirements and associ-
ated fees for accounts in this program. Had these requirements not been waived, account
holders would have been charged $6 per quarter on accounts with balances of less than
$300.
Clients were also asked, but not required, to sign a research consent form.
Postcards announcing the program were mailed in January 2003 to 3,200 clients of
CAPTC, but this mailing was ineffective and generated virtually no detectable response.
Copies of survey instruments are available from the authors.
The take-up rate may have been higher in R2A because participants who have used
other CAPTC services in the past and have a favorable opinion of the organization might
be more likely to use another CAPTC service. However, CAPTC reports that tax clients
do not generally identify the free tax preparation service with CAPTC.
While research on the impact of ChexSystems (and similar) credit scoring services on
banking participation by the poor is limited, BOk's practices are probably the norm
among banks. However, some depository institutions waive ChexSystems either as a
general rule or in the specific instance of targeted saving programs.
We ran several logistic regression models to identify predictors of take-up. Findings
were not robust, so we cannot say whether differences that were significant in a bivariate
framework would remain significant when other differences were controlled.
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) project, a national study of IDA pro-
grams, found that participants with the lowest incomes had the highest average saving
rates. However, regression analysis on ADD participants did not find that income had a
significant effect on the likelihood of being a saver (defined as saving a specified mini-
mum over the life of the program). The ADD research also found that having health158 Beverly, Schneider, and Tufano
insurance was positively related to being a saver (Schreiner, Clancy, and Sherraden
2002), but our findings suggest that health insurance is negatively related to R2A enroll-
ment.
In 2003, the unemployment rate in Tulsa was 6.5 percent, the highest annual rate in
fifteen years (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 2004).
These decliners chose the following response option: "I'd be interested if there was a
match or if there was an option to save for a specific purpose." It is unlikely that individ-
uals would have given this response to an open-ended question. Still, these responses
suggest that the service, as delivered, was not attractive enough to elicit participation.
The per capita data is restricted to those participants who responded to the survey
item on existing savings and for whom there is data on the amount of the refund sent to
savings (n = 68).
We attempted to reach participants and comparison group members multiple times
over the follow-up period. Only two of those contacted refused to complete the follow-
up survey. It seems unlikely that participants who did not save disproportionately
avoided the follow-up interview.
Data on anticipated refund amounts come from different sources for the two groups.
Comparison group members were asked to estimate refund amounts before tax prepara-
tion began. For participants, data were taken from the Taxwise software after tax prepa-
ration was completed.
Data are not available on the types of accounts opened or how many accounts each
household opened. Among all participant households that kept their accounts open
through November (not just new BOk customers), 19 percent (7) purchased new prod-
ucts after the tax season.
There are three important data quality issues in addition to the small sample. First,
respondents may have been unable to accurately recall refund uses for 2003. Since the
R2A outreach emphasized the value of saving, we assume that over-reporting of saving
in 2003 was more common than under-reporting. If this is true, our test is conservative,
all else equal. Second, we cannot account for changes in economic or personal circum-
stances that would affect the use of a refund. The final issue involves mismatch in timing.
For saving in 2003, each person was asked to report whether she was saving three months
after refund receipt. For saving in 2004, each follow-up survey respondent was asked
whether she was currently saving some portion of the refund, and the timing of follow-
up surveys varied from three months to five months after refund receipt. Again,this
data flaw is likely to make our test more conservative because people are less likely to
have some of the refund in savings as time passes.
Our experiment allowed refund recipients to invest only in a completely liquid
vehiclea standard savings account. Participants who wanted a less liquid product,
such as a certificate of deposit or a savings bond, may have chosen not to split. In future
research, it would be useful to examine the demand for less liquid products, which may
encourage and facilitate longer-term saving and financial planning.
It is possible that our survey underestimated demand for this service in the wider
market. A large portion of the remittances sent abroad from the United States are
directed to Latin America. The most likely senders of these remittances, Hispanics, were
under-represented in our sample because we did not recruit participants at CAPTC's
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The splitting participation rate is calculated as the number of splitters (62) divided by
the number of individuals approached expecting a refund (516). The participation rate
had ChexSystems not been used is calculated as the number of participants splitting (62)
and the number denied by ChexSystems (36) divided by the number of individuals
approached expecting a refund (516).
H&R Block has offered two programs in which a participant can open either an IRA
or a savings account at the time of filing (Tufano and Schneider 2005) and effectively
offers splitting services.
Wojciech Kopczuk and Cristian Pop-Eleches use 1999 SOl data to report that 67 per-
cent of EITC eligible families used a professional tax preparer. See Kopczuk and Pop-
Eleches, "Electronic Filing, Tax Preparers, and Participation in the Earned Income Tax
Credit," Columbia University working paper, March 2005, http://www.co1umbia.edu/
wk2llO/bin/efile.pdf (last accessed May 30, 2005). Data on the size of the VITA market
is drawn from "Tax Administration: IRS's 2003 Filing Season Performance Showed
Improvements," 2003, United States General Accountability Office (GAO); National Tax-
payer Advocate 2004 Annual Report to Congress, 2004, Taxpayer Advocate Services, Internal
Revenue Service; Internal Revenue Service, "Tax Stats," http: //www.irs.gov/taxstats/;
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 2001, Individual income tax statistics-
2001, Table 3.3-2001: individual income tax, all returns: Tax liabffity, tax credits, tax
payments, by size of adjusted gross income, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/Olin33ar
.xls.
Specifically 76 percent of those surveyed answered yes to the following: "Most sav-
ings accounts in banks currently pay about 1 percent interest. Suppose you could send
part of your refund to save in a savings bond that paid 3.4 percent but wouldn't allow
you to withdraw the money for several months. Would you consider sending part of
your refund to save in a savings bond?" The rates we quoted in the survey question
were representative of those offered at the time through bank accounts and savings
bonds.
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